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For this reason, a full discussion of the issue by the Supreme Court,
as it relates to political rights cases, will likely be necessary to avoid
further conflicting opinions in the lower courts.
While it is not clearly known whether the attitude of the Court
toward exercising equity jurisdiction in redistricting cases which arose
in the federal courts would be equally hostile to such cases originating
in the state courts, it is quite probable that both avenues to the Supreme
Court were foreclosed by South v. Peters. Even though equity jurisdiction is denied in the redistricting cases, there remains a possible redress in an action for damages. 47 In addition, there is the possible use
of the writ of mandamus in the state courts, as in Smiley v. Holm, by
bringing into question the validity of a state law under the Federal Constitution, and thereupon gaining direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court if the highest state court sustains the validity of the
state law.
ROBERT E. GILES.
Insurance-Automobile Comprehensive Coverage
The development of the comprehensive automobile insurance policy
has been rapid in recent years and the policy has become one of the
major coverages in North Carolina. It is an extensive sort of policy
including loss of or damage to an automobile from such older causes
as fire and theft as well as losses from more novel causes such as
missiles, falling objects, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water,
flood, vandalism, and civil commotion. Generally, the clause provides
that the coverage extends to any loss or damage except by collision or
upset.'
The coverage of the comprehensive clause, however, is subject to a
number of exclusions and exceptions. In North Carolina, the coverage
does not apply (a) while the car is used as a public or livery conveyance, (b) while the car is subject to an undeclared encumbrance, (c)
during war or revolution, (d) if the damage to the automobile is caused
by mechanical breakdown unless such breakdown would otherwise be
covered, (e) to wearing apparel or personal effects, (f) to tires unless
they would otherwise be covered, or (g) to loss due to conversion or
embezzlement or secretion by anyone lawfully entrusted with possession
2
of the car.
,"This possibility may be inferred from language in Colegrove v. Green, 328
U. S. 549, 552 (1946). See note 34 supra.
1 Often losses falling within what would commonly be covered under an
ordinary collision policy are also included within the comprehensive clause. See
Billings, Present Periphery of Comprehensive Coverage, 306 INs. L. J. 572 (1948).
2North Carolina Automobile Certificate of Insurance Specimen, December,

1947.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

There have been very few cases in which this coverage has been
construed by the courts, but an interesting case3 was tecided recently
under the North Carolina comprehensive clause of the standard form. 4
The policyholder discovered in June, 1949, that beetles had bored into
the wood portion of her station wagon and had eaten out and damaged
the wooden frame. Insurance policies had been taken out on the 1946
vehicle in 1947, 1948, and 1949, and the last policy was cancelled by
the company in September, 1949. The court, in holding that the plaintiff could not recover, rested its decision on the ground that the complaint did not allege that the entry and damage caused by the beetles
occurred between the effective dates of the policy. The court further
stated that the damage was not the result of "direct and accidental loss"
as contemplated in the policy. Apparently relying on the construction
adopted in accidental death cases in this state, the court distinguished
between accidental "means" and "result." 5 Much respectable authority
in other jurisdictions ignores this distinction.6 It is believed that these
cases are founded on sounder policy and that their view is more easily
applied.
Even if the distinction is sound in the accidental death cases, however, it seems to have been misapplied in the instant case. In Fletcher
v. Security Life and Trust Co.,7 cited by the principal case, the court
held that there could be no recovery for death caused by the injection
of an anesthetic since the policies only covered "death by accidental
means" and not "accidental deaths." In the principal case the policy
'Kirkley v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 232 N. C. 292, 59 S. E. 2d 629
(1949).
' There are standard provisions set out in our automobile insurance specimen
of
policy to protect the insured. The policy forms are subject to the approval
T
the Insurance Commissioner. N. C. GEN. STAT. §58-54 (1943). Mc eal v. Life
and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 192 N. C. 450, 135 S. E. 300 (1926).
r Courts advocating strict construction argue that "accidental" refers only to
the event or occurrence which produces the result and not to the result itself.
This view is clearly enunciated by the North Carolina court in Fletcher v. Security
Life and Trust Co., 220 N. C. 148, 150, 16 S. E. 2d 687, 688 (1941), where it was
stated: "The insurance is not against an accidental result. To create liability it
must be made to appear that the unforeseen and unexpected result was produced
by accidental means." Other North Carolina cases indorsing this view are: Scott
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 160, 179 S. E. 434 (1935); Mehaffey v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co.. 205 N. C. 701, 172 S. E. 331 (1934) ; Harris v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 385, 168 S. E. 208 (1933).
' Justice Cardozo aptly expressed this view in a dissenting opinion in Landress
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 501 (1934): "If there was no
accident in the means, there was none in the result for the two are inseparable.
No cause that reasonably can be styled an accident intervened between them ...
There was accident throughout or there was no accident at all." Other cases supporting the above view are: Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 Kan. 858,
67 P. 2d 607 (1937) ; Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 273 N. Y.
140, 7 N. E. 2d 18 (1937); Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 607,
180 A. 649 (1935) ; Ocean Acc. and Guaranty Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 182
S. E. 221 (1935).
See also cases cited in note 5, supra.
7220 N. C. 148, 16 S. E. 2d 687 (1941).
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provided for "accidental loss" and not for "loss by accidental means."
The North Carolina Supreme Court in the past has classified a number of events involving automobiles as "accidents." It has held that a
person falling from an automobile forced off the road,8 a tire going flat
causing the car to overturn, 9 and lights going out causing a car to go
ovrer an embankment 0 are "accidental." A great variety of other situations involving Workmen's Compensation Insurance have also been held
to be "accidental" by our court. 1
The strict construction which the court placed upon the word "accidental" in the instant case defeats the underlying purposes of comprehensive coverage. 12 The words "any 'irect and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile" were seldom found in the standard policies
of other states prior to 1948.13 Usually in other jurisdictions the clause
began with the phrase "any loss or damage to the automobile" rather
than with the more restrictive phrase used in our state.14 The construction adopted by our court in the principal case is not in line with
the spirit of comprehensive coverage.1r
' Higgins v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 220 N. C. 243, 17 S. E. 2d 5
(1941).
'Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N. C. 497, 181 S.E. 562 (1935).
" Littrell v. Hardin, 193 N. C. 266, 136 S. E. 726 (1927).
" Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 42 S. E. 2d 96 (1947) (heart
attack from exertion) ; Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N. C. 184, 41
S. E. 2d 592 (1947) (strain from lifting a plate) ; Brown v. Carolina Aluminum
Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E. 2d 320 (1944) (push by fellow employee); Ashley
v. F-W Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942) (assault); Robbins
v. Bossong Hosiery Mill, Inc., 220 N. C. 246, 17 S.E. 2d 20 (1941) (fall when
reaching for material); Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N. C. 28, 1 S.E. 2d
121 (1939) (lime in eye from pouring); Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214
N. C. 449, 199 S.E. 623 (1938) (illness from eating defective food).
125 APPLEMAN, INsuRANCE LAW AND PRACrICE §3222 (1941).
"The restrictive phrase used in North Carolina is also found in Tennessee.
Lunn v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 584, 201 S. W. 2d 978
(1947). In Alabama the only word used to preface the phrase is "direct." Lockwood v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 28 Ala. App. 179, 181 So. 509
(1938).s Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162, 27 S. E. 2d 791 (1943);
Teitelbaum v. St. Louis Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 296 Ill. App. 327, 15 N. E. 2d
1013 (1938); Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.
2d 483 (1947); Wheeler v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 65 A. 2d 10 (Me. 1949);
Roberts v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 203 S.W. 2d 508 (Mo. 1947) ;
Rea v. Motors Ins. Corp., 48 N. M. 9, 144 P. 2d 676 (1944); Tonkin v. California Ins. Co. of San Francisco, Inc., 294 N. Y. 326, 62 N. E. 2d 215 (1945);
Mathews v. Shelby Mut Plate Glass and Cas. Co., 46 N. E. 2d 473 (Ohio 1939);
Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. Weatherman, 193 S. W. 2d 247 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946). In 1947, the National Automobile Underwriters Association
recommended that the phrase "any direct and accidental loss of or damage to the
automobile" be included within the comprehensive clause itself rather than the less
restrictive phrase "any loss or damage to the automobile." The words of the new
clause had been on the face of the old form before the recommended change.
The purpose of the more restrictive phrase was to exclude intentional and remote
losses as distinguished from accidental and direct ones. There was no intention
to narrow the construction placed on the word "accidental."
"A leading writer on insurance states: "Most companies have now adopted
the policy of writing what is termed 'comprehensive' coverage, which is for the
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It is advocated that North Carolina should place a broader interpretation on the word "accidental" so as to include any unexpected or
unusual occurrence. The court's statements in regard to the "accidental"
nature of the loss in the principal case may be regarded as dicta in future
cases since the outcome of the case rested on other considerations. It
is further believed that a preferable construction of the words "direct
and accidental" to "direct or accidental" would broaden the coverage
of the comprehensive clause so as to include losses covered by the same
clause in other states.
GEORGE

J. RABIL.

Labor Law-Employer Refusals to Bargain Collectively
in the Southern Textile Industry
Since 1935, national labor policy has been to encourage the practice
and procedures of collective bargaining. The Taft-Hartley Act,1 though
otherwise curtailing union activities and the bargaining process, ostensibly added to2 the Wagner Act3 in respect to this stated policy. Section
8(b) (3) creates a new unfair labor practice for unions refusing to bargain collectively. Section 8(a) (5) continues to make the employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the union selected by his employees, an
unfair labor practice.4
5
Nevertheless it is still possible for a skillful employer to evade the
duty to bargain collectively, at least, temporarily. In Tower Hosiery
Mills, the North Carolina company
"....

went through many of the motions of collective bargaining.

It met on numerous occasions with the union, conferred at length
regarding contract proposals, made concessions8 on minor issues,
and discussed and adjusted several grievances."
purpose of including all property damage to an automobile, other than mechanical breakdown, exclusive of collision losses. It includes all of the older coverages . . . and in addition many new losses never before contemplated by any
coverage whatever. It is a simple and convenient form of insurance. . . . It is
not a profitable coverage to the average insurer, as the hazards therein included
bring the loss rates above the premium level, but it does possess excellent sales

angles, and is simple of analysis and application." 5 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW
AND PRAcTicE §3222 (1941).
161 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).

'§§171 and 174.
349 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq. (1946).
' The N.L.R.B. first determines whether the union in fact represents a majority
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
But outright refusals to bargain are not uncommon in Southern textiles.
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1442 (1948) enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d
504 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Postex Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 118Z948), rev'd on other
grounds, 181 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950); Highland Park Mfg-.-Co., 84 N.L.R.B.
744 (1949).
-81 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1949), enforcenent granted, 180 F. 2d 701 (4th Cir.
1950).

